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Case No. 7970

IN THE S·UPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of FLORENCE
P. HOWARD, also known as F P.
HOWARD,
D-eceased.
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, LT·D.,
as Administrator with the Will Annexed
of the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, Deceased, and COLINA FERRIE,
1

•

Petitioners in Intervention
and App·ellarnts,
-vs.HELEN DUYS, ETHEL FORREST,
ERNEST F. HOWARD, THE PROTE·STANT BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS and McGILL UNIVER:SITY,
MILDRED BLACK, HILDA BLACK,
ROGER BLACK, RACHEL HELPS. and
WALKER BANK & TRUS·T COMPANY,
a Utah Banking corporation, Executor of
the Estate .o:f Florence P. Howard, also
knotwn as F. P. Howard, Deceased,
Respondents.
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REPLY BRIEF OF' CONTESTANT RES.POND·ENTS
INTRODUCTION
In ans·wering the Brief of Appellants on Intermediate Appeal, represented by Mr. Rice and associates,
we shall in order to avoid confusion, refer to such Appellants· as Intervenors. This being the answe·ring Brief of
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the original Cnntestants, Helen Duys, Ethel Forrest and
Ernest F. Howard, we will denominate it the Contestants'
answering Brief, and are authorized to state that Gustin,
R'ichards and Mattsson and Fred H. Evans, representing
Respondents, The Protestant Board of School Colllluissioners and McGill University, j'Oin in this Brief. As to
point I of Intervenors' Brief, we make no comment, since
that is more properly the responsibility of the attorneys
for the Executor.
POINTS II AND III - INTERVENORS' BRIEF
We discuss jo:intly points II and III; since they involve but one question, namely, the right to intervene
on the 'basis attempted.
May it be kept in 1nind that on May 14, 1952, the
Court admitted to prohate four instruments as constituting the Last Will and Testament of Decedent (R. 33).
On Nove1nher 12 and within the six months period allo\\'ed hy law, these Contestants filed contest attacking the
validity of the orde·r admitting to probate the instruments of 1939 and 1940 (R. 131). Therefore, on N ovenlber 15 when the s'ix months limitation had expired, the
order admitting to probate the 1949 and 1952 instrtm1ents
became final and uncontestable, and they togethPr ennstituted the Last Will of decedent if Contestants "·erP
successful in their position. Otherwise, the order \vas
final as to all four instruments, and they together ('Onstituted the Last Will. Thereafter, on or about Decenl'her
6, Mildred Black, on 'behalf of herself, heT brother and
t'vo sisters, filed an instrument denominated HAppearance and Ans,ver" (R. 62). It i·s an inartificially dra\\·n
2
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dootunent, probably prepared by herself and constitutes
in its "rording more of an attempt to render an opinion
as to the Testatrix's intention. In any event, we assume
it should be considered an answer to the will contest
and in response to the citation served on these parties
when the contest w·as initiated. In no event can it be a
eontest as to the 1949 and 1952 instruments since the
order of the court in relation to these had already become
final Intervenors and the Blacks occup·y the same position so far as the starting of a new will contest is involved.
On January 14, 1953, Intervenors filed a Motion to
Intervene on the basis of an "Answer and Cross Complaint in Intervention" filed concurrently (R. 141, 162).
The first part of this instrument constitutes an ans"\ver
to the contest, and as such, could p·roperly have been
filed 'by any interested party without any order of court
except as to its l~ateness, as to which no question was
raised :and except as it attacked a Court order already
final.
However, Intervenors did not choose to do this. By
tying the two together and makling a Motion to Intervene
in order to start a new will contest after the period of
limitations had run, they S'ought to do indirectly what
they obviously could not do directly.
Their motive is obvious. If they could throw out all
four instruments, the-y, as cousins once removed, would
inherit. If they could throw out ail except that of 1952,
which contained no residuary clause, they would at least
come in :for the resi·due. It did them no good to go along
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with the timely contest, since the order aillnitting to prObate the 1949 and 1952 wills, now final, disposed of Mrs.
How~ard's estate.
May we emphasize that Intervenors had no interest
\Vhatever in the contest before the court. They "~anted to
start a new contest, and instead of saying so, which 'vould
have made the impossi~bility of their position obvious,
they attempted to come in as parties in the pending contest. When, most properly, not permitted to do so under
the instrument they proffered, they now take the position that any interested party may intervene in a pending
action. Assuming Intervenors had filed an answer to the
contest, as they properly might, and then atten1pted to
intervene under their cross complaint, the defect would
have 'been obvious. They would have been in court as to
the pending conte:st. They would have been out as to the
cross complaint on the ground that they were starting
a will contest attacking an order of the court, which was
absolutely final. Having joined the two to serve their
purpose, they are hoist by their own petard and now
complain that they had no day in court to pursue, their
objective of attacking the 1949 and 1952 instruments.
Utah decisions at least slant at this question in the rases
of
Dayton v. Free, 162 Pac. 614, 49 Ut. 221 ~
and
Price v. Hanson, 206 Pac. :272, 60 lJt. 29.
1

They there indicate that the question presented is as to
whether the petitioning Intervenors could have started
a lawsuit of their O\Vn along the lines sought by inter4
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vention. Certainly, on January 1-+, 1953, petitioning
Intervenors eould not have started any such lawsuit of
their own, nor 1nay they rlaiin the benefit of one already
~tarted, because they ·are seeking something entirely
different. In other '\vords, there is no community of interest.
Utah Oode Annotated 1953, 75-3-12 provides in its
pertinent 'vording,
··~~ny perS'on who has not contested a will* * *
n1ay eontest the sru:ne or the p~rohate thereof at
any tiine 'vithin six months after the admission to
probate and not afterw~ards * * *"
What is a will eontest~ Bancro£t's Probate Practice,
Volu1ne 1, page 395 says it appears to be, in usual parliance, merely a designation of any kind of a litigated
controversy concerning the eligrbility of an instrument
to probate. That very properly covers exactly what C:ontestants had done within the tin1e pe·rmitted by law as.
to the 1939 and 1940 instruments. It also covers exactly
what Intervenors were attempting to do, beyond the time
permitted by law, as to the 1949 and 1952 instruments.
The New Mexico court, in the case of
In Re Martinez' Will, 132 Pac. 2d 422,
says in substance that the right to contest ·a will is not a
common law right, but a right conferred s'olely by statute, which should he strictly construed; that it is a new
and independent action, the right to prosecute which
eannot accrue until there has been an order admitting
the will to probate.
The Kansas court in the case of
Pownall v. Connell, 122 Pac. 2d 730,
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holds that any cause of action which a pleader can set
down on pap·er which, if established, would necessarily
render a will nugatory is a "will contest", and must be
brought within the time permitted by statute for will contests.
The Arizona court, in
In Re Hesse's Estate, 157 Pac. 2d 347
lrolds that a "will contest" is any kind of a litigated controversy concerning the eligibility of an instrument to
probate, as distinguished from the validity ·of the contents of the will.
We have, perhaps unduly, supported with authority
what may appear to the court an ·obvious definition, but
we do 'vish to make douhly clear that what Intervenors
were attempting to do, both in their Answer and Cross
Complaint, was to start a new ''contest". As previously
stated, there could have 'been no possible objection to
Intervenors filing such answer to the contest as they desired, j·oining with the ~ontestants if they \vished, or
opposing them if they preferred, so long as they did not
attempt under such guise to bring in a cause of action as
to which the statute of limitations had already run.
There is no quarrel with Intervenors' authorities as
to the right to intervene in general or in particul·ar. The
sole question here presented is whether, under the gui~e
of intervention, these parties may start a lawsuit of their
own. The general rules as to right to intervene, so long
as the Intervenor comes within the issues of the pending case, are perfectly clear. Intervenors' quotation fron1
2 Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, pag-e 1139 ,,·ell
6
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covers the situation. .A.8 there stated, intervention will
not as a rule be allowed when it will retard the p-rincipal
suit, or delay the trial, or change the position of the original parties, or the form of the action or issues. We believe it :rrray 'be safely said that Intervenors' p·osition flies
in the face of all these prohibitions. They wanted t:o
start the contest all over, call witnesses (what they expected to learn they did n'ot say), delay the entire proceeding, and change the issues to ·attack admission to probate of the 1949 and 1952 instruments, which order had
never been questinned within the time allowed by law.
Bancroft says, at page 1139,
"it is sufficient that the ultimate issue to be determined remains the same."

By any S'tretch of the in1agination did Intervenors bring
thernselves within this requirement~ They quote fron1
the Colorado case of
Cache LaPoudre Irrigation Company v.
Hawley, 95 Pac. 317,
in "\vhich the court says the

questi~on

to be determined is
whether or not "the intervenor has injected a ne'v issue
into the case in which he is allowed to intervene." In
other words, does the ultimate issue to he deteTmined
remain the same~ Counsel attempted to avoid this obvious proh~bition by contending th-a.t the ultimate question, that is issue, is as to whom the propeTty of Florence
P. H~oward should be distributed. But this is not an action to construe a will. It is a statutory contest subject to
statutory limitatinns. If attacking the final order of the
court admitting certain instruments to probate, which

7
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had ~ever there·tofore been attacked, was not ra1srng
a completely new issue, and that after the time had expired, it would be difficult to imagine such a case.
The right to intervene and be saved from the bar
of the statute of limitations depends on whether there is
a community of interest or privity of estate between the
would-be Intervenor ·and the party who colillnenced the
action within the statutory time.
34 Am. J ur. 225-6 ;
Rockwell v. Junction City, 141 Pac. :299
(Kan.)
In the instant case, the positi'on ~aken by the Intervenors
is exactly opposed that taken by Contestants. Instead of
there being a community of interest, Intervenors are
see·king to throw Contestants out completely. Their positions are fundamentally and wholly inconsistent. Intervenors cite the Kansas case of
Weichold v. Day, 236 Pac. 649,
which they indicate is an Oklahoma case. That case
quotes with approval the trail blazing l{ansas rase of
Maurier v. Miller, 93 Pac. 596.
in this field. In the W eich'old case, the Intervenors
sought to do exactly what the Contestants were atteinpting to do; that is, have set aside the order of the court
admitting to probate a particular testa1nentary instrument, not to start a new and entirely antagonistic lawsuit.
The requirement for contest within six months i~
1nore than a mere limitati·on of action. It provides a condition upon which the cause of action itself ceases to exist after the prescribed period.

8
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Woodruff v. £t.lorville, 107 N.E. 2d 911 (Oh.).

The purpose of the conditi·on or limitation is to acc.elerate the s~ttlement of estates.
Weese v. Weese, 58 S.E. 2d 801 (W. \Ta.)
\Vhere 'vill eontest was not filed until the last day of
limitation and the petition so filed was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, the court was there ..
after without jurisdiction to authorize contestants to
amend the petition supplying the necessary averments.
Vought v. Hall, 225 Pac. 2d 822, (Okla.).
There is a conflict of authority as to whether a party
1nay intervene in a "within time" will contest, when th~
period of limitation has expired. The more ltberal rule,
'vith which we have no slightest quarrel, permits such
intervention. The question generally arises when the
orig·inal Contestant attempts to dismiss his contest over
the objections of the Intervenor, and it is held that the
Intervenor may continue the contest, but all this assumes
that he had a right to intervene, and that brings us hack
to the basic condition. When he intervenes, he must take
the contest as he finds it. He cannot start a new l awsuit.
Cases cited by Intervenors completely substantiate this
position, and it is entirely in keeping with the general
rules as to intervention. Intervenors cite the early Kansas case of
Maurier v. Miller, supra
1

In that case, the Kansas court, speaking of the rights of
the Contestants to dismiss and the rights of the Intervenor to continue the ~action, says at page 597-8,
"Pending the final determination, he" (the
9
1
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contestant) "may see fit to abandon the sUit, or
he may be found to have no right to maintain it
for the reas·on that he is estopped by having accepted under the will, or soine othe-r obstacle 1nay
stand in the way of his maintaining the suit; but,
if the grounds for setting aside the will alleged
in his petition are established, the intervenor may
upon the same grounds maintain the action. The
intervenor takes the suit as he finds it. He is n-ot
permitted to change the form of the action or the
issues, or to raise a new one." (Italics supplied.)
Intervenors likewise cite
In Re Butzow's Estate, 68 Pac. 2d 374 (Cal.)
Again, we accept Intervenors' authority. Ennis was the
ContestJant. The eourt says :
"Appellant, by her petition or con1plaint,
sought to join in the con test. She also alleged
substantially the same grounds of contest as those
contained in the Ennis ple·ading."
The court holds, and we feel rightly, that she h'ad a right
to intervene, even though the time had run as to her, because she t'Ook the suit as she found it.
Again, we accept Intervenors' citation of authority
in the Califiornia CJase of
Voyce v. Superior Court, 127 Pac. 2d 536.
Again the Californ'ia court holds that the Contestant may
not dismiss over the objections of the Intervenor, but
again the court repeatedly adve-rts to the fact that the
Intervenor took the case as he found it. At page 540, the
court says:
"The right to file a petition in intervention
under the circmnstances present here \Vas not
barred by re-ason of the fact that it was not filed
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\vithin six months after probate; there was a will
contest pending, which was filed in time ood no
t~ttempt was made to raise new grounds of contest." (Italics supplied.)
~£\.gain the Court says on page 541,
"Prior to that dismissal the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter; th!at is, a contest of
the will on the grounds stated in the contest, and
the intervention was filed prior to the dismissal,
claiming the identical relief involved in the contest
then before the court."
and again,
"In the case at bar no new issues, that is,
grounds of contest have been raised, and no pTe·judice has been suffered by petitioners."
.. and again,
"In the case at bar no new issues are raised,
the issues are identical, that is, the validity of the
\vill with reference to the specific grounds of attack. It is not the purpose of the contest to determine heirship, or the rights as between the contestants to the assets of the estate, but the validity
of the will is the only issue."
In a later Californi'a case,
In Re Walters' Estate, 202 Pac. 2d 89,
the eourt discusses the same question. In this case contestants had dismissed their action wherein Appellant
had not obtained the right to intervene. The Court, on
page 90, summarizes the remedies originally open to him
as follows:
"As far as app.ellant's rights are concerned, it
is clear that he coui'd have pursued any one of
three recognized methods of contesting this will.
He could h'ave filed a contest (1) before p-rohate
(Sec. 370, Pro. c~ode), or (2) within six months
11
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after probate (id. 380) as did Crann, or (3) he
could have 'become a party to the Crann contest
hy intervening therein pursuant to sec. 387, Code
Civ. Proc., even after the six months had run, his
grounds having been the sanle as those in the ba._~oo·ic
contest." (Italics supplied.)
INTERVENORS' POINT IV
Intervenors cl'aim they had reasonable cause to believe they would be successful if permitted to interYene.
In fairness, we must assrune that every litigant \vho
starts an action or attempts to come into one already
started would make the same claim. Suffice it to say
that Intervenors' good faith is not an issue in the matter
before the c~ourt. In the first place, it has not, so far as
we know, been questioned, and in any event would be
irnmate!rial
Intervenors are simply atte1npting, under another
guise, to argue the case they presumably would haYe
presented had they been permitted by the Trial C~ourt
to contest the validity of the 1949 and 1952 instruments.
The law, we believe, does not in any way suhstanti~ate
their position under statutes such as ours, but this issue
has no part in the pending appeal, and we refrain fron1
a by-path excursion. We cannot imagine a method of
more completely disregar·ding Mrs. Howard's evidenced
intentions, than to distribute her estate to cousins once
removed, whom she had never 1nentioned in any of hPr
four testamentary instruments.
1

INTERVENORS' POINT V
Intervenors have given but brief attention to the
portion of the court's judgment dis1nissing their Cro~s
12
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Complaint in Intervention (R. 247, 249). We commend
their brevity and wili follo'v their e2eample.
All the c'Ourt did \Vas to dismiss this attempted new
action, and 'vhether that order re1nains as a part of the
Decree appears immaterial so far as we are concerned.
The matter of their right to intervene is before this court
on Intermediate Appeal. The decision of the court will
control the entire matter, and Intervenors' rights can he
in no manner prejudiced by the findings or order in question. F'in'ally, the judgment in the will contest is not before this Court on an intermediate appeal.
CONCLUSION
In summary, as to the correctness of the Trial Court's
order denying the motion to intervene, may we say that
Intervenors have cited no authority giving them the right
to enter the lists with a different contest after the time
for contest has expired. The authorities cited by them
fully substantiate Contestants' position that they must
take the suit as they find it.
Respectfully submitted,
BEVERLY S. CLENDENIN and
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT
& MABEY,
Attorneys for Contestant Respondents I-Ielen Duys, Ethel Forrest and
Ernest F. H·oward.
HARLEY W. GUSTIN,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS &
MATTSS.ON and FRED H. EVANS,
Attorneys for Respondents, Protestant Board of School Com.missioners and McGill University.
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